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1. Introduction 
Since the start of the recent financial crisis European economies have gone through several 
business contextual changes: financial system restructurings, government debt issues, lower 
economic growth rates, the ongoing globalization process and technological advancement in 
business concepts. The combined shock effect of these eventually affect manager decisions 
how to increase their shareholder wealth. Has the contextual change Europe is going through 
changed investor receptions towards M&A investments as also announcement effects tend to 
vary in magnitude based on macro-level factors (Beltratti, Paladino, 2013)? The abnormal 
returns generated by M&A announcement effects have been widely researched, though not in 
the most recent years in Europe.   
It has been studied by Martynova and Renneboog (2006) that in Europe the acquiring 
company statistically significantly outperforms the market near the announcement date 
though overall the acquirer tends to underperform the market in a 121-day event window 
around the announcement date. They also find evidence that all-cash deals tend to 
underperform all-stock deals in abnormal returns in the event window. The timeframe of their 
analysis however only accounts years 1993-2001 which mostly were times of bull market, 
which means all-stock deals are favored over all-cash because the acquirer stock is generally 
over-priced and then cheaper to finance than cash. Therefore, the sample may be unbalanced 
and undermine all-cash bid announcements. Since the beginning of 21th century all-cash deals 
have in average been favored over all-equity bids, so an updated sample could reveal different 
results. 
For the recent years the market has instead been bearish, and all-cash deals dominate all-stock 
deals in quantity. Alexandridis, Petmezas and Travlos (2010) found out all-cash deals 
outperform all-stock deals in terms of abnormal returns in several uncompetitive markets 
including Europe excluding UK over a 4-day event window during partly the same timeframe 
as in Martynova and Renneboog’s research. Also the aftermath of the financial crisis has 
affected economic reality on the old continent since their paper: economic growth has been 
estimated to stay stagnant for years and interest rates are partly negative. Because of these 
changes in the economic landscape in Europe, I want to test Martynova and Renneboog’s 
findings to see if especially all-cash deals have been in general affected by consequences of 
the financial crisis we are now experiencing. 
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I analyze abnormal returns generated by all-cash M&A announcement effects on the acquiring 
company’s stock in three different time periods, pre-crisis, mid-crisis and post-crisis. I use 
event study methodologies to statistically test the generated abnormal returns for different 
event windows and with several statistical test methods 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background 
for the possible influencers of all-cash M&A announcement abnormal returns which are 
impacted by the crisis and its consequences. Section 3 describes my data and its properties. 
Section 4 shows the methods I use in my analysis as well as discusses critically some 
uncertainty they present. Section 5 shows the empirical results and discusses them and section 
6 concludes and gives suggestion for further research. 
2. Overview of current literature 
Current literature agrees generally on evidence of significant abnormal returns on the 
announcement date for the target company. Earliest findings over a period of 1955-1985 
suggest abnormal returns of 24% to target shareholders (Franks and Harris 1989) whereas the 
latest studies report on target announcement abnormal returns of 9% (Goergen and 
Renneboog 2004). However, for bidding firms the findings suggest abnormal returns varying 
by the acquirer’s home market. Martynova and Renneboog (2006) find significant returns for 
6 developed markets in Europe and also for the whole European market at -3% for a 121-day 
event window, which however is influenced by the dominant representation of developed 
markets in the sample. Overall the latest studies report contradictory findings on the 
significance of bidding firm announcement effect abnormal returns. Andrade et al. (2001), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Franks et al. (1991), Healy et al. (1992) report small negative 
announcement returns for the bidders, and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), Schwert 
(2000), Loderer and Martin (1990), Asquith et al. (1983) on the other hand find small positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement of M&A deals. Alexandridis, Petmezas et al. (2010) 
find abnormal returns of 2.10% for a 5-day event window for all-cash deals in Europe for the 
period 1990-2007 and they outperform all-stock deals for event windows two and five days 
in proximity of the announcement date. 
Cyclical macroeconomic factors that influence bid announcement returns include the 
announcement’s timing in respect to the M&A market’s activity peak. Bids that are 
announced in early stages of an M&A wave perform better than those announced in proximity 
of the activity peak (Shelton 2000). Jensen (2004) argues that managers make poor 
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acquisitions because there are no good ones left. Managers tend to overpay for the merger 
because they are overconfident of the performance of the acquisition. The overconfidence 
stems from slow information processing and self-interest (Harford 2003). Such M&A waves 
have usually occurred because of positive non-financial and financial influencers, such as 
technological, political and industrial shocks as well as bullish markets M&A waves tend to 
start off slower and suddenly due to a negative economic shock. (Martynova, Renneboog, 
2008) 
Another influential cyclical factor is the cyclical market trend and market volatility. In times 
of heightened market volatility and bearish trend best-performing companies announce M&A 
investments more frequently than poor-performing ones (Beltratti, Paladino, 2013). They 
studied European banking sector’s M&A characteristics during the recent financial crisis and 
they report abnormal returns are greater for more efficient, profitable and less-leveraged 
banks. 
Beltratti and Paladino (2013) also find significant changes in M&A announcement behavior 
during the recent financial crisis in comparison to pre-crisis circumstances. The 
announcement effect remains insignificant from zero, but a positive shock is realized with 
abnormal returns at the date of deal completion. This is hypothesized by increased investor 
uncertainty. They also find cash deals underperforming equity deals which is in contrary to 
the signaling effect, which is explained as investor disappointment to cash expenditure in the 
market’s liquidity crisis. They also suggest that investor reactions to M&A announcements 
may depend significantly on the macroeconomic context, which is overshadowed by analysis 
of dependencies on different deal attributes.  
During the recent crisis corporate capital expenditure did not drop substantially, even though, 
corporate lending of banks fell significantly. Instead corporations used their internal capital 
as an alternative financing source. Therefore payout of companies fell sharply in the peak 
years of the financial crisis 2008-2009 to retain their cash balances and investment plans 
according to Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2015) because external finance was too costly to make 
profitable investments. Often these announcements are made at the same moment as 
investment announcements, which could influence mid-crisis M&A announcement effects. 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that better investor protection associates with more hostility in 
bidding as well as increased frequency of all-equity bids. Good investor protection leads also 
to lower agency costs regarding cash and debt holdings since excess cash is paid out and 
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opportunistic managers are removed from charge by shareholders. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), as well as Servaes (1991) on the other hand find that hostile attitude of the bid show 
significantly lower acquirer returns than friendly bids. Hostile bids refer to bids which are 
targeted straight to shareholders instead of making the bid to the company’s management. 
Higher investor protection would therefore lead to lower acquirer gains. 
Alexandridis and Petmezas et. al (2010) find evidence that the incompetitiveness of the 
European M&A market leads to significant acquirer abnormal returns as the premia are lower 
and redistribution of gains from the acquirer to the target being smaller than otherwise. Jlassi 
and Mansour et. al (2012) conclude that overconfidence bias is a driving force of market 
disturbance, such as abnormal returns, independent from the market circumstances.  
Based on these general market phenomena I hypothesize that there is difference between pre 
–and post-crisis ARs since pre-years were bullish whereas post-years mostly bearish. I also 
hypothesize during the crisis there are negative abnormal returns post-announcement because 
of investment and payout announcement simultaneity as well as abnormal return postponing 
to completion date. I also hypothesize there is a causal effect between low interest rates and 
increased all-cash abnormal returns. 
3. Data 
3.1 M&A data set 
The M&A transaction data is received from SDC Platinum and it includes 2904 domestic 
M&A deals announced by public companies in the sixth takeover wave between 1/2002 and 
10/2016 in Europe excluding UK. Spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, 
and repurchases, as well as deals involving Australian private target companies classified by 
local legislation (and thus SDC) as public are excluded. All-equity and mixed bids are filtered 
out as well as bids with unknown or other payment methods. Cross-border deals are left out 
because their announcement effects have been shown to differ greatly from domestic M&A 
transactions at -4% compared to -2.5% abnormal returns for domestic transactions 
(Martynova, Renneboog 2006), which can be reasoned by acquirer gains possible reflections 
on shifts in investor protection across countries (Bris, Cabolis, 2008). Cases where a single 
company announced more than one M&A transaction on the same day are left out of the 
analysis sample as such instances would create unbalanced effects in comparison to the other 
95% of my observations in the results. To eliminate diluting in the results minimum 
transaction value is set to 5 million USD, and the acquirer is required to acquire more than 
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50% of target’s available stocks in the deal, and previously the acquirer is required to have 
owned less than 10% of the target’s available stocks.  
For my regression analysis I require the stock price and market index data from t20 to t-120 of 
the acquiring companies, where t0 is the announcement date. Both data sets are obtained from 
Datastream, companies with incomplete data are filtered out. This leaves a total sample of 
337 M&A deals with appropriate price and financing data for the period. See tables 1 and 2 
for geographical and annual distribution of the sample. As with similar M&A studies, France, 
Germany and Sweden dominate the sample with 73, 36, and 43 observations respectively, 
totaling at 152 which is 45.2% of the total sample. A mentionable difference between sample 
structures of earlier studies and this one is that past soviet nations Poland and Russia reserve 
a total of 34 observations together which account 10.1% of the total pre-analysis sample. The 
sample sizes per year seem to correlate well with annual M&A activity, only 2015 and 2016 
have relatively small samples in comparison to the trend as well as 2002 having only 4 
observations.  
In my analysis I estimate expected returns by a simple market model, which for some stocks 
indicated high error terms. To improve the robustness of my results I need to take those 
observations out of consideration. I will discuss this matter later in the methodology and its 
limitations sections. The analysis sample distributions are also indicated in tables 1 and 2. 
I also classify the observations into three period sub-samples based on their observation dates, 
pre-crisis, mid-crisis and post-crisis. More details on the sub-samples in methodology section. 
The pre-analysis and analysis distributions per sub-sample and country are shown in tables 3 
and 4. 
3.2 Limitations of data 
The M&A data comprises mostly only data from old market economies in Europe and only 
two former soviet states have contributing data available, because other Eastern European 
acquisitions have no adequate data for their financing method nor stock price data which are 
critical for my hypothesis testing. The data is also quite concentrated in countries such as 
France, Germany and Sweden, but it is a common problem among M&A research on European 
markets. 
However, similar studies to mine have usually had larger sample sizes which eventually 
depends on my relatively short analysis timeframe. Especially the post-crisis sub-sample, 
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which I am going to define later in the paper, on which I am going to base my research question 
is modestly small. This also is partly due to Datastream, which is my only stock price data 
source, suffering from lack of European stock price data. Market value data for the sample 
companies is also not adequately available in Datastream which leads to having deals with 
relatively low transaction value to the market value of the acquirer in the sample, which 
eventually may have diluting effects on my results. I hope to subset this limitation with a higher 
minimum transaction value filter than in other similar studies.  
4. Methodology 
4.1 Methods used in AR testing 
Because my aim is to analyze possible changes during and after the crisis in comparison to pre-
crisis I divide my sample into three sub-samples based on the date of announcement. M&A 
announcements before September 2007 belong to ‘pre-crisis’ sub-sample, observations after 
September 2007 and before October 2012 belong to ‘mid-crisis’ and transaction 
announcements after that point are part of ‘post-crisis’ sub-sample. The sub-sample 
breakpoints are determined by the negative shock in the TED spread in August 2007 and the 
Q3/12 to Q4/12 exits from the latest statistical recession by several European countries that 
contribute data to this study. 
With event study methodology I can capture the effect of certain events on shareholder wealth. 
This methodology is developed by Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969) and it is widely used 
in event study papers. I also replicate statistical methods used in an M&A announcement effect 
study by Banerjee and Deisting, et al. (2012) who study the occurrence of the phenomenon in 
BRICKS countries, and Martynova and Renneboog (2006) who wrote the latest paper about 
European M&A announcement effects on abnormal returns.  
The event observation timeframe extends from 𝑡20 to 𝑡−20 where 𝑡0 is the announcement date. 
Further I divide the sub-samples into pre–and post-announcement sections to observe possible 
information leakages, acquisition expectations and insider trading activity, (𝑡−1 − 𝑡−20) and 
(𝑡20 −  𝑡0)  respectively. In addition to (𝑡20 − 𝑡0) and (𝑡−1 −  𝑡−20) event windows I also 
examine (𝑡20 − 𝑡−20) window to capture the aggregate effect of announcing a deal and (𝑡1 −
𝑡−1) window as well as only 𝑡0 to observe the immediate effect of the announcement more 
closely. I use stock closing price data of the acquirer and closing values of benchmark market 
indices ranging from 𝑡−120 to 𝑡20 to implement a market regression model similar to Sehgal, 
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Banerjee & Deisting, which I use to estimate expected return for stock i on day t. Next I convert 
the daily price data into a return series as follows: 
𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒 (𝑃𝑖,𝑡/ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1)    (1) 
For each day and stock I receive a dynamic beta which is based on the closing prices of stock 
i as well as closing values of benchmarked market index of the acquirer’s home market from 
the last 100 market days. This way the expected returns are less static for the whole period and 
incorporate volatile changes on the stock and market index better than a static one. The model 
is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖  + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡  𝑅𝑚,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
Rm, t is the market return on day t in the home market of security I, εi, t the zero mean error term, 
αi is the intercept and βi, t the coefficient for the market return, respectively. 
As I mentioned above, I try to improve the robustness of my further analysis by only 
considering transactions for which’s acquirer’s expected returns the market model shows 
average coefficient p-values lower than 5%. This does not however remove bias completely, 
and it should be taken into account when discussing the results of my analysis. My final sample 
which I use here on includes 208 transactions, further description of the sample and sub-
samples is given in appendices 3 and 4.  
Next I check 1st order autocorrelation of the market model by using Ljung-Box Q-test. I regress 
day t returns with day t-1 returns to receive the autocorrelation coefficients, and remove 
correlation terms which are insignificant. The test statistic Q follows chi-squared distribution 
with h degrees of freedom.  
𝑄 = 𝑛(𝑛 + 2) ∑
𝑝2
𝑛−𝑘
ℎ
𝑘=1      (3) 
Null hypothesis about independently distributed data is rejected if: 
𝑄 >  𝜒1−∝,ℎ
2      (4) 
Where 1-α is the critical level. For each sub-sample there are h = 139 (return observations - 
1) lags, based on the estimation timeframe and event window, that are tested at lag k = 1 
(day) and n = significant correlation observations. In the mid-crisis sub-sample I detect 
autocorrelation at 5% significance level and eliminate it by using generalized least squares 
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estimation with 1st order autocorrelation parameter to receive proper market model 
parameters. 
I define abnormal returns as difference ARi, t = actual return i,t – expected return i,t , where 
expected return is the value Ri, t received from the market model. Cumulative abnormal returns, 
CAR i, are calculated for each transaction by adding up each days ARi, t. The significance of my 
CARi results is tested by calculating the standardized CARi as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
√
𝑛
𝑛−2
∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
      (5) 
I find that 58.7% of the deals generate significant abnormal returns in the timeframe post-
announcement and 55.8% pre-announcement. These portions do not differ significantly from 
the ones of pre- and mid-crisis but in the post-crisis sample only 46.8% of announcements 
generate significant pre-announcement excess returns and 53.2% post-announcement. Further 
distribution per country and sub-sample is shown in table 5. Next I test the significance of 
abnormal returns of the event windows of each sub-sample by using two parametric test 
statistics which are discussed in detail by Brown and Warner (1985), the standardized portfolio 
test and standardized test for CARs . Therefore I need to also define CAARt, which stands for 
cumulative average abnormal returns.   
I calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns, CAARt, for each sub-sample by summing 
average abnormal returns of each day in the timeframe. To statistically prove the significance 
of CAARt of each sub-sample I calculate SCAARt, which is the standardized CAARt.  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
√
𝑛
𝑛−2
∗ 𝜎𝑝,𝑡
     (6) 
σp,t is calculated using Markowitz Portfolio formula to also take into account cross-correlations 
between abnormal returns of transactions if their event windows overlap. 
𝜎𝑝,𝑡
2 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2𝜎𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 +  ∑ ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗𝑝𝑖,𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1     (7) 
pi,j is the correlation coefficient between the abnormal returns of stocks i and j on overlapping 
days, xi = xj = 
1
𝑛
 , where n = sample size to make each stock equally weighted. The SCAARt 
values follow a two-tailed Student t-distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom. The portfolio 
test assumes abnormal returns are higher with higher variance observations. The method is a 
good one to take into account correlations of overlapping event window observations, but it 
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gives less weight on securities with low variance. Therefore I next calculate the standardized 
test for CARs which gives more weight on low variance securities. 
The statistic is calculated as: 
 𝑡𝑠𝑡 = √
𝑁(𝐿𝑖−4)
𝐿𝑖−2
1
𝑁
∑
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
?̂?(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1    (8) 
With L being the size of the estimation window = 100, N sample size, and ?̂?(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) defined 
as the sample standard deviation of CARs of the individual securities referring to the event 
window t. While this method gives more weight to low variance abnormal returns it also 
assumes the true abnormal returns are constant among securities. 
Lastly I use the Corrado non-parametric test statistic, which is free from any specific 
assumptions on the return distribution, contrary to correct specification of other non-parametric 
tests, for short 5-day event windows as well as for the announcement date. The test statistic has 
neither hindrance of cross-correlating abnormal returns. To calculate the Corrado test statistics 
I need to rank the 5-day event window CARs for each security in ascending order where the 
highest CAR’s rank = k. The test statistic for each event window (𝑡−20 − 𝑡−16), (𝑡−15 −
𝑡−11), … , (𝑡16 − 𝑡20) is calculated as: 
 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑇−0.5∗(𝑊𝑁𝑖=1 +1)
?̂?(𝑇𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)
    (9) 
Where T is the rank of event window CAR of security i, W the amount of event windows, and 
?̂?(Taverage) the standard error of average rank differences’ of event windows’ compared to the 
mean statistic value 0.5*(W+1). ?̂?(Taverage) is calculated as: 
 ?̂?(Taverage)=√
1
𝑊
∑ [
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑇 − 0.5 ∗ (𝑊𝑁𝑖=1 + 1)]
2
         (10) 
Same methodology is applied also to announcement date abnormal returns with W = 41. Under 
the null hypothesis, trank follows the standard normal distribution. It is shown by Campbell and 
Wasley (1996) that compared to parametric test statistics the Corrado test statistic is 
consistently the best-fit one on many event occasions such as increases in variance on event 
date, multi-day event windows and clustered event dates. However with the increase of event 
window size in comparison to the whole data timeframe (estimation window + event window) 
the statistic loses power (Luoma, Pynnönen, 2010), therefore I have not included the whole 
pre- and post-announcement event windows to this test measure. 
12 
 
4.2 Limitations of methodology 
I replicate methods used in the study of Banerjee, Deisting and Sehgal (2012) who study the 
same matter as this paper does in semi-developed economies, which have many divergent 
influencers in comparison to my sample of European economies. They only use the portfolio 
test statistic which gives weight on high variance observations which are typical for more 
illiquid markets such as the BRICKS. Their robustness checks for market model coefficients 
seem inferior in comparison to several similar studies (Martynova, Renneboog, 2006) 
(Alexandridis, Petmezas, Travlos, 2010). Therefore their methods may not eliminate plausible 
bias effectively. 
I followed the paper closely and used the same methods until I found the paper of Martynova 
and Renneboog (2006) which I there on followed more closely than the BRICKS paper, and 
which uses similar methods and in addition the standardized CAR test and the Corrado test, 
which eventually give more robustness to their findings. However, due to my analysis 
preparation aim of only -20 and +20 days around the announcement date, I couldn’t use the 
Corrado test for the pre- and post-announcement windows as whole. Also as the analysis 
framework is slightly different from Martynova and Renneboog, the findings of this paper 
should not be directly compared to those of Martynova and Renneboog, as my market model 
which greatly influences the outcome of abnormal return generation is based on daily betas 
contrary to raw downward biased stock-specific betas. Therefore my results should be taken as 
slightly uncertain, even though I find significant results on several tests for some sub-samples. 
The results of my quantitative analysis can be found in tables 6 and 7. 
5. Discussion about results 
5.1 Description about findings 
The findings suggest, that post-crisis cumulative abnormal returns have generally risen. Pre-
crisis event window (𝑡20 − 𝑡−20) indicates -1.880% CAARs on 10% significance on 
standardized CAR test and 1% significance on portfolio test. The pre-announcement negative 
abnormal returns of -2.130% are significant at 1% level according to both test statistics which 
is partly conflicting with earlier studies about the subject, but also in line with agency cost 
theory about cash-piling and information leakages which are usual for illiquid markets. Several 
sample selection criteria also may affect the contrary result to other studies e.g. the same event 
window is not used, and that the often M&A research samples dominating UK is not included.  
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These results could also be reflected by the theory that later M&A transactions in M&A waves 
tend to show lower performance than those in the beginning of the wave in terms of 
announcement effect returns. 2006 and 2007 had M&A volumes similar to 1999 and 2000 
when the latest M&A peak was and worse acquirer performance for that period has been found 
in earlier studies. Also years 2002-2004 are relatively inferiorly accounted in the sub-sample 
as 2005-2007 account for 78.8% of the sub-sample size. 2002-2004 were early of the upcoming 
bull-market and M&A wave which would according to M&A timing theory create positive 
abnormal returns whereas 2005-2007 have the opposite effect. 
Mid-crisis abnormal returns both pre –and post-announcement change significantly. Pre-
announcement cumulative average abnormal returns are found to be significant at 1% 
confidence with 1.14% whereas post-announcement average abnormal returns are -1.29% with 
1% confidence when tested with the portfolio test. However, the standardized CAR test does 
not find significance even at 10% level for any event window except (𝑡1 − 𝑡−1) and 𝑡0. The 
overall CAAR for the event window is insignificantly different from zero at -0.16% according 
to both test statistics, which could be hypothesized by the high market volatility and therefore 
high polarization of observations.  
These findings fit to the conclusion that in bear market and higher market volatility conditions 
M&A’s are usually executed by companies with the most stable financial basis which explains 
the positive pre-announcement abnormal returns. Negative post-announcement CAARs of this 
event window are in line with the findings of Beltratti and Paladino that during the crisis 
announcement ARs were realized at the completion of the deal because investors were too 
uncertain of the outcomes of the bid announcement. Probably transactions before the Lehman 
crash of this sub-sample could also be affected by the M&A timing theory because the shock 
ended the wave.  
When financial institutions lowered their credit supplies during the crisis the financial 
resources of companies did not lower significantly because they started to utilize alternative 
sources of funding, such as lowering payout. These decision announcements are usually given 
the same moment as investment decisions such as M&A transactions, due to signaling, which 
would explain the negative post returns, also agency cost theory about cash-financing is in line 
with this finding.  
Post-crisis the analysis results change direction in contrast to the mid-crisis sample. Pre-
announcement average abnormal returns become statistically insignificant at 0.261% and post-
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announcement average abnormal returns are significant at 1.198% according to portfolio test 
and standardized CAR test.  This sub-sample is the only one which’s whole event window has 
significantly positive CAAR, which it has at 1.459%. These results would imply the negative 
effect of using cash as a financing method has weakened post-crisis where the results imply 
negative post-announcement CAARs in average. M&A activity yearly since the financial crisis 
has been modestly volatile, so I would not find this an implication of an early M&A wave, 
especially when the economic expectations are also quite moderate. 
Also it is to note that the announcement day’s abnormal return or the (𝑡1 − 𝑡−1) CAAR do not 
significantly change during pre- and mid-crisis but in post-crisis the initial announcement date 
reaction has diluted to 0.671% but it still is significant at 1% according to the standardized 
CAR test. However the Corrado test statistics show quite contrary results to the two other 
statistics. Announcement day statistics are still significant, however mid-crisis statistic is 
insignificant. This strengthens the hypothesis that during the crisis the initial announcement 
reactions were calmer than otherwise. For the 5-day periods there are significant results for 
some observations, more interestingly mid-crisis has two post-announcement periods which 
have positive significance contrary to earlier statistics which show negative ARs post-event. 
This anomaly cannot be even reasoned by early deal completion dates which averagely are 76 
days later than the announcement for the mid-crisis sub-sample. It is to note however that the 
statistic loses statistical power with more event windows, even though it has been studied to be 
the most constant measure of event study analysis.  
5.2 What do my results mean? 
Because the standardized CAR test favors low-volatility securities I base my discussion on its 
values. The portfolio test is too polarizing on the study timeframe which includes high market 
volatility periods, also small sample sizes amplify its test statistic values, so I place only little 
weight on it. However, mid-crisis pre –and post-announcement ARs are close to being 
significant on the CAR statistic, and the average results are in line with existing theories of 
cash-financing during the liquidity crisis and using payout cash flows as alternative financing 
sources, which have negative effects on AR post-announcement. The positive pre-
announcement ARs are also in line with good-quality companies dominating the sub-sample. 
These results therefore highly replicate Beltratti and Paladino’s findings on M&As within 
European banking sector during the crisis. 
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Post-announcement ARs increase post-crisis is the most reliant finding of this paper because it 
shows constancy among all test parameters. This finding is still in contradiction with most 
existing literature that state there are no significant ARs, or at best small ones, for acquirers in 
Europe. The reason why I found significant ARs is due to many studies having long timeframes 
which typically have included at least one M&A wave and the results have been generalized 
to one sample whereas I capture one M&A wave in more detail by separating sub-samples. 
Existing studies also have done sub-sampling and find positive ARs for acquirers at the start 
of an M&A wave. Although, the period starting from 2008 has had volatile annual M&A 
activity which leads to my conclusion that we are not experiencing a clear beginning of an 
M&A wave, where higher ARs are recorded. Current political nor economic circumstances 
stimulate positive shocks that tend to start M&A waves. 
The consequences of the financial crisis have led to very long-sight bearish expectations about 
future growth. Low internal growth possibilities lead managers to seek growth externally which 
is welcomed by shareholders and leads more sensitively to positive reactions on the stock 
market. Also the current loose monetary policy in European countries induces investment and 
has reduced cost of leverage in recent years which could explain the effects of all-cash bids. 
However, leverage ratios of European companies have not risen since 2012 according to NYU 
Stern statistics, mostly because the low interest rates have not been channeled to corporate 
loans that effectively except for the couple recent years. Leveraging also leads to agency costs, 
so this argument cannot explain the positive ARs. Corporate governance has neither increased 
significantly in European countries during the timeframe of my study, which would lead to 
lower agency costs and more welcomed reaction by the market. 
The incompetitiveness of European M&A market is still significant when measured by value 
of average M&A transaction, which serves as a proxy for paid premia. In comparison to North 
America the premia are significantly lower in Europe in average throughout the sample 
timeframe according to Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances statistics. Higher 
premia correlate with lower acquirer ARs, and this parameter has stayed constant throughout 
the sample timeframe so it cannot explain changes in the sub-samples though it affects my 
results overall. 
It is clear that bid-specific attributes, such as payment method, financing source, bid attitude, 
domestic vs. cross-border, corporate investment strategy and deal type yield constant results. 
After all announcement effects are hard to generalize since the outcome of the bid depends on 
the synergies and market share increases attained, which are the real factors that increase 
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incoming cash flows and shareholder value. These benefits are harnessed in varying 
timeframes, but often take months or years, so there’s modest uncertainty of the real outcome 
at the announcement of the M&A, which are possibly influenced by overconfidence, which is 
amplified by analyst opinions. The constancy of announcement day positive ARs in this paper 
and in previous studies is in line with general overconfidence on the announcement date. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper addresses the need for an update on M&A announcement effects on abnormal 
returns in Europe, since the financial crisis has had several earlier unseen consequences on the 
economic context of present day. I find that acquirers experience statistically significant 
positive post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns post-crisis for 20 days which is in 
line with incompetitiveness of the European M&A market, and corporate growth seeking when 
internal growth possibilities are small. This is valued higher by shareholders than recently due 
to current negative macroeconomic factors.  
There’s no implication that due to overall low interest rates corporations would be induced to 
increase investment, so favoring cash as the payment method specifically does not increase all-
cash ARs post-crisis. I cannot specify statistical significance for ARs during the crisis, although 
my insignificant results are otherwise in line with Beltratti and Paladino’s study on the matter. 
Overall this study about abnormal returns generated by M&A announcement effects brings 
new findings to existing literature about implications of changes in ARs due to the 
consequences of the financial crisis but a longer timeframe after the crisis is needed in the 
future to confirm the findings even more significantly. Also since the causality of 
macroeconomic variables and M&A ARs is plausible, they should be studied with closer detail 
if the post-crisis ARs stay significant for a longer period than I have now analyzed. At the 
moment M&A AR cyclicality cannot be ruled out completely due to such a short analysis 
timeframe.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Geographical distributions of samples 
  
Pre-analysis sample 
Sufficiently robust coefficients in 
market model   
Austria 3 0.9 % 3 1.4 % 
Belgium 13 3.9 % 7 3.4 % 
Denmark 8 2.4 % 5 2.4 % 
Finland 18 5.3 % 10 4.8 % 
France 73 21.7 % 42 20.2 % 
Germany 36 10.7 % 28 13.5 % 
Iceland 3 0.9 % 1 0.5 % 
Ireland-Rep 8 2.4 % 4 1.9 % 
Italy 35 10.4 % 27 13.0 % 
Netherlands 17 5.0 % 11 5.3 % 
Norway 14 4.2 % 8 3.8 % 
Poland 19 5.6 % 2 1.0 % 
Portugal 5 1.5 % 4 1.9 % 
Russian Fed 15 4.5 % 2 1.0 % 
Spain 15 4.5 % 12 5.8 % 
Sweden 43 12.8 % 34 16.3 % 
Switzerland 12 3.6 % 8 3.8 % 
Total 337 100 % 208 100 % 
 
Table 2: Annual distributions of the samples 
 
Pre-analysis sample 
Sufficiently robust coefficients in 
market model  
2002 4 1.2 % 3 1.4 % 
2003 13 3.9 % 8 3.8 % 
2004 13 3.9 % 7 3.4 % 
2005 27 8.0 % 18 8.7 % 
2006 38 11.3 % 26 12.5 % 
2007 35 10.4 % 26 12.5 % 
2008 24 7.1 % 18 8.7 % 
2009 22 6.5 % 9 4.3 % 
2010 23 6.8 % 13 6.3 % 
2011 35 10.4 % 23 11.1 % 
2012 30 8.9 % 15 7.2 % 
2013 24 7.1 % 12 5.8 % 
2014 27 8.0 % 15 7.2 % 
2015 13 3.9 % 8 3.8 % 
2016 9 2.7 % 7 3.4 % 
Total 337 100 % 208 100 % 
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Table 3: Analysis version of sub-sample geographical distribution 
 Pre-crisis % Mid-crisis % Post-crisis % 
Austria 1 1.2 % 2 2.5 % 0 0.0 % 
Belgium 1 1.2 % 2 2.5 % 4 8.5 % 
Denmark 3 3.7 % 1 1.3 % 1 2.1 % 
Finland 4 4.9 % 6 7.5 % 0 0.0 % 
France 12 14.8 % 17 21.3 % 13 27.7 % 
Germany 15 18.5 % 10 12.5 % 3 6.4 % 
Iceland 0 0.0 % 1 1.3 % 0 0.0 % 
Ireland-Rep 2 2.5 % 2 2.5 % 0 0.0 % 
Italy 10 12.3 % 10 12.5 % 7 14.9 % 
Netherlands 7 8.6 % 1 1.3 % 3 6.4 % 
Norway 1 1.2 % 4 5.0 % 3 6.4 % 
Poland 0 0.0 % 1 1.3 % 1 2.1 % 
Portugal 1 1.2 % 0 0.0 % 3 6.4 % 
Russian Fed 0 0.0 % 2 2.5 % 0 0.0 % 
Spain 5 6.2 % 4 5.0 % 3 6.4 % 
Sweden 16 19.8 % 13 16.3 % 5 10.6 % 
Switzerland 3 3.7 % 4 5.0 % 1 2.1 % 
Total 81 100%  80  100% 47 100%  
 
 
 
Table 4: Pre-analysis version of sub-sample geographical distribution 
 Pre-crisis % Mid-crisis % Post-crisis % 
Austria 1 1.2 % 2 2.5 % 0 0.0 % 
Belgium 3 3.7 % 8 10.0 % 2 4.3 % 
Denmark 4 4.9 % 2 2.5 % 2 4.3 % 
Finland 7 8.6 % 3 3.8 % 8 17.0 % 
France 22 27.2 % 29 36.3 % 21 44.7 % 
Germany 17 21.0 % 9 11.3 % 9 19.1 % 
Iceland 2 2.5 % 1 1.3 % 0 0.0 % 
Ireland-Rep 3 3.7 % 1 1.3 % 4 8.5 % 
Italy 14 17.3 % 16 20.0 % 4 8.5 % 
Netherlands 9 11.1 % 7 8.8 % 1 2.1 % 
Norway 3 3.7 % 5 6.3 % 6 12.8 % 
Poland 1 1.2 % 14 17.5 % 4 8.5 % 
Portugal 2 2.5 % 3 3.8 % 0 0.0 % 
Russian Fed 3 3.7 % 8 10.0 % 3 6.4 % 
Spain 6 7.4 % 4 5.0 % 5 10.6 % 
Sweden 19 23.5 % 13 16.3 % 10 21.3 % 
Switzerland 4 4.9 % 3 3.8 % 4 8.5 % 
Total 120 100 % 128 100 % 83 100 % 
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Table 5: Statistically significant abnormal returns per country in the event window 
 Pre-crisis Mid-crisis Post-crisis 
 Pre-0 Post-0 Pre-0 Post-0 Pre-0 Post-0 
Austria 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Belgium 0 1 4 2 1 1 
Denmark 3 3 1 1 1 1 
Finland 2 2 1 1 5 3 
France 7 7 13 11 3 7 
Germany 6 8 3 3 2 3 
Iceland 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Ireland-Rep 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Italy 5 4 7 6 3 2 
Netherlands 6 4 2 1 0 0 
Norway 1 0 3 3 0 2 
Poland 0 0 1 2 0 0 
Portugal 1 1 3 2 0 0 
Russian Fed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 4 4 2 4 2 1 
Sweden 8 10 4 8 5 4 
Switzerland 2 3 0 2 0 1 
Total 47 48 46 48 22 25 
% of sub-sample 58.0 % 59.3 % 57.5 % 60.0 % 46.8 % 53.2 % 
 
 
Table 6: Results of analysis, means bolded, sub-sample test statistics of portfolio test and 
standardized CAR test below them. Colors indicate significance levels. 
 Pre-
announcement 
Post-
announcement 
Combined 
(t-20 - t20) 
t-1 - t1 0  
Pre-crisis -2.130 % 0.250 % -1.880 % 1.098 % 0.854 % 
t(portfolio) -11.48 1.21 -9.59 4.55 3.36 
t(stCAR) -3.23 0.36 -1.96 2.80 3.20 
        
Mid-crisis 1.135 % -1.290 % 0.156 % 1.331 % 0.905 % 
t(portfolio) 5.19 -5.16 -0.68 5.08 2.89 
t(stCAR) 1.51 -1.54 -0.14 3.16 2.55 
        
Post-crisis 0.261 % 1.198 % 1.459 % 1.354 % 0.671 % 
t(portfolio) 1.07 5.70 6.29 5.65 2.56 
t(stCAR) 0.41 2.08 1.69 4.62 2.78 
      
 1% 
significance 
5% 
significance 
10% 
significance 
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Table 7: Corrado test statistic results per sub-sample 
 t-20 - t-16 t-15 - t-11 t-10 - t-6 t-5 - t-1 t0 t1 - t5 t6 - t10 t11 - t15 t16 - t20 
                   
Pre-crisis -0.27 -0.22 1.32 0.97 2.96 -1.51 1.27 -0.52 -1.02 
            
Mid-crisis -1.12 -0.82 -0.43 -0.73 0.95 0.13 1.37 1.85 -0.26 
            
Post-crisis 0.80 1.42 0.11 1.02 1.42 0.33 0.62 1.79 0.77 
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